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REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
Georgene Vairo*
I

Introduction

When two jetliners slammed into the World Trade Center,
another dive-bombed into the Pentagon, and the final one ditched
into a field in Pennsylvania, our world and our lives changed. I
happened to be in New York City that day, waiting in my brother's
driveway for a car to take me to the airport for my 10:30 a.m.
American Airlines flight back to Los Angeles. My mother was with
me, waiting for a car to pick her up to take her to Pennsylvania
Station for a train to Florida. As we stood there, waiting anxiously
for our already late respective cars, the ground under my feet felt as
if it was shaking like an earthquake. Based on my L.A. experience, I
figured it was about a 2.2 magnitude tremor. Because I had been
standing on the driveway since a little after 8:30 a.m., I had no idea
that what I must have felt was the second plane crashing into the
South Tower.
When the cars finally arrived, both at about 9:20 a.m., the driver
of my mother's car said he could not bring her to Penn Station
because he heard that Manhattan was shut down. I decided
nonetheless to try to make a mad dash for Kennedy airport. Feeling
anxious for some unknown reason beyond the fact that I was late, we
decided to ask the driver's dispatcher about the status of the airports.
Of course, we were told that all the airports had been shut down, too.
I returned to intercept my mother, and we figured out how to break
back into my brother's empty house.
Once we did, we gasped together as we turned on the television
and watched the World Trade Towers burning. We kept watching in
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. This Article explores some of the issues raised in my Civil
Remedies component of Loyola's Law & Terrorism course. I wish to
acknowledge the tremendous assistance of Andrew Sokolowski in the
preparation of this Article.

1265

1266

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 35:1265

horror, as everyone else in the country probably was, and so many
people throughout the world were, but our thoughts immediately
turned to my brother. He left us at about 9:00 a.m. to take the
subway into his office two blocks from the World Trade Center.
Where was he? Of course, cell phones weren't working; we could
not get through to him and he could not get through to us.
We had no idea whether he was dead or alive; stuck in a dark
subway tunnel; being overrun by other panicked passengers. There
was no information about the subways at all.
Luckily, he never made it past Fiftieth Street. My brother made
his way home by walking and catching lifts once out of Manhattan,
but it took hours for him to get home. When he walked in the door
hours later, we all hugged and cried. We were a lucky family. So
many others were not. It appeared that the deaths, the injuries, and
the suffering would be on a scale unknown to our country. Even
those of us who did not lose a family member lost friends, or had
close friends who lost their loved ones. Additionally, we lost our
sense of security and invulnerability as a nation.
When most of us think about September 11, 2001, we think
about the horrible images we saw, and wonder why anyone would
want to cause such death, damage and destruction. At the time, we
thought about finding the perpetrators and punishing them, but few
of us considered the civil lawsuit landscape.
Nonetheless, the needs of the families of the people injured and
killed stayed in our minds and our hearts. Unprecedented private
giving to charities providing for the families of the dead and the
injured poured out. Additionally, there was quite unprecedented
restraint on the part of the plaintiffs' bar. For instance, Leo V.
Boyle, president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA), urged his members not to bring any lawsuits.' Instead, we
saw bar associations coming together to provide pro bono services to
the families in need. 2 But as a lawyer, and particularly as a law
1. See Diana B. Henriques, Lawyers Offer Free Advice In Tapping
FederalFund,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at B 11; see also William Glaberson,
The Lawyers: Lawyers Saidto Back Compensation Plan to Polish Image, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at A9.

2. Trial Lawyers Care (TLC) is one such organization set up, by ATLA,
after the attacks to provide legal services. Visit the organization's website at
http://91 llawhelp.org/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
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professor who has been studying mass torts for decades,3 I was
curious to see how the victims of the World Trade Center (WTC) and
Pentagon bombings would be compensated. Would there be
lawsuits? How many of them? Who would the defendants be? How
much money would there be to pay? How could the victims get any
money out of Osama bin Laden? Would Congress do anything? In
my first classes after the September 11 attack, I asked my Civil
Procedure and Complex Litigation students these questions. We
discussed various types of claims that different plaintiffs might
bring-personal injury, property damage, loss of business; problems
of obtaining jurisdiction over and enforcing judgments against
Osama bin Laden and others responsible for the attacks; theories of
liability for holding the airlines, World Trade Tower officials, and
others responsible, and the complex insurance coverage disputes that
would arise, among other issues. I suggested that it would take some
time for the contours of the litigation to develop, and that it was
unlikely we would see Congress enter the fray in the near term.
Much of what we predicted has transpired. A complicated array
of cases is already occupying the time of the courts, and many others
will be filed in the future. To name a few: 1) there is complex
litigation involving the insurers of the WTC over whether the plane
crashes in Lower Manhattan were part of one occurrence or two, the
resolution of which would result in proceeds of $3.5 billion instead
of $7 billion; 4 2) various personal injury suits have been filed against
Osama bin Laden and others; 5 3) businesses who lost money due to
3. See Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness
on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 167 (1985) [hereinafter Multi-Tort Cases]; Georgene M. Vairo, The

Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims

Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79 (1997) [hereinafter Claimants Trust];
Georgene M. Vairo, Essay: The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm
Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) [hereinafter Paradigm

Lost].
4. See Stephen Labaton, A Nation Challenged: Liability; Insurer Sues to
Limit Its Payoutfor World Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at B5.
Since the attacks, Larry Silverstein, who holds a ninety-nine year lease on the

WTC property, has settled with two of his other insurers. Ace Bermuda
Insurance, Ltd. agreed to pay $298 million, and XL Insurance Ltd. settled for
$67 million. See Jonathan D. Glater, Holder of Trade Center Lease Settles
with Two Insurers,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at B3.
5. See Mark Hamblett, Bin Laden Named in Suit: N.J. widow files first
action stemmingfrom Sept. 11 attack, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 22, 2001, at A4. This
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the curtailment of flights in the immediate aftermath of September 11
and the steep drop in tourism have brought numerous suits. 6 Notices
of claim have been filed against the city of New York by rescue
workers and others who believe that breathing the noxious fumes
7
emanating from the WTC site has caused respiratory problems.
After briefly summarizing these types of cases, and the
interesting set of federal statutes that could be invoked to provide
federal subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign or
American victims of terrorism or human rights abuses suffered in
foreign countries, 8 I will focus principally on the Congressionally
enacted September 11th Victims Compensation Fund of 2001 (VCF),
and discuss some of the interesting issues the VCF raises.
In Part II, I will canvass the traditional tort lawsuits that victims
of the September 11 attacks may bring, as well as the specialized
statutes that provide federal jurisdiction and remedies for victims of
terrorism. Part III discusses the VCF. I was quite surprised that
Congress acted as quickly at it did. But, as a proponent of
aggregated solutions to mass tort cases, I thought the move had great
potential. 9 Lawyers ought not get rich off of this disaster. All
victims should receive reasonable compensation within a short time
frame. However, aside from questions about the fairness of the
regulations prepared by the Special Master and problems with the
statutory scheme, Congress' action raises some interesting questions
relating both to fairness and federalism. After describing the VCF
and some of its problems, in Part IV, I will turn to a consideration of
these questions.
II. TRADITIONAL TORT AND SPECIALIZED FEDERAL REMEDIES
The terrorist attacks on September 11 created a vast range of
plaintiffs. It was obvious that those suffering personal injuries or the
representatives of those killed on September 11 would file civil
article provides a brief description of Doe v. The Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, 01 Civ. 9074, a case filed in the Southern District of New York
by a Jane Doe plaintiff regarding the death of her husband in the North Tower.
6. See Robert A. Schwinger, High Court Suggests No 'Economic Loss'

Remedy for Disaster,N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 7.
7. See John J. Goldman, N.Y. Rescue Workers Move to Sue Over
RespiratoryDamage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at A 10.

8. See infra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Claimants Trust, supra note 3, at 156-66.
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lawsuits for compensation. This original plaintiffs' group would
include people killed in the four jet crashes, as well as the people
working at or visiting the WTC and the Pentagon. It also would
include the police officers, firefighters, and other rescue workers
who were injured or died as a result of the attacks.
Other plaintiffs would sue for property damage sustained as a
result of the attacks and for loss of business resulting from the
shutdown of air traffic in the days following the attacks and the
drastic decline in travel in the wake of the attacks. Given the
magnitude of damage, it was clear that there would be insurance
coverage disputes.
A new set of claimants recently emerged in the months after
September 11. There is continuing concern that the air quality in the
vicinity of the WTC is unhealthy. For three months, fires continued
to burn. Many of the workers at the site developed the "WTC
cough" and a host of other health problems. Over one thousand
notices of claim have been filed on their behalf against the city of
New York. It is quite possible that other workers, as well as people
who live and work in the area of the WTC, will file suits as well.
Who would the plaintiffs sue? There are several sets of
defendants: 1) American Airlines and United Airlines, as well as the
companies charged with airline security; 2) owners, operators of the
buildings; WTC security personnel; the City and Port Authority; the
architects and contractors who designed and built the WTC; and
other similar defendants (WTC defendants); 3) Osama bin Laden and
other individuals, entities, or states responsible for the attacks; and 4)
various governmental entities. As a professor who writes and
teaches in the area of mass torts, claims arising out of the WTC and
Pentagon disaster would provide a career's worth of classroom
examples, articles, and books. There would be numerous procedural
and substantive problems managing and resolving the lawsuits that
have already been filed, and that are likely to be filed in the future.
With respect to the first set of defendants, there would be no
problems obtaining jurisdiction or enforcing judgments. However,
given that those who hijacked the jets brought no illegal objects
aboard, 10 determining the liability of the airlines could be somewhat
10. See generally Andrew Tilghman, For Stranded Travelers, the
FrustrationBuilds, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Sept. 15, 2001, at BI
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problematic. Of course, various theories of negligence could be
advanced, but the case for liability is arguably not as strong as in the
case of Pan Am Flight 103, the Lockerbie crash case," where
terrorists smuggled a bomb aboard the jet. And, despite the
sympathy factor, it is arguable that jurors would be less likely to find
the airlines culpable.
With respect to the WTC defendants, there are some indications
that some WTC security personnel told the workers in the second
tower that they should go back to their offices. 12 Otherwise, their
degree of culpability appears to be somewhat tenuous as well.
The terrorists, of course, are obviously substantively liable, but
how will personal jurisdiction be obtained and judgments enforced?
With respect to governmental entities such as the city of New York,
the state and federal government, and their agencies, to what extent
will sovereign immunity preclude recovery by those injured? These
questions just scratch the surface.
Additional issues are presented by the use of various specialized
statutes that provide an opportunity to sue the terrorists and their
sponsors in United States courts. Briefly, however, there are several
avenues available to victims of terrorism, both United States citizens
and foreign citizens, for seeking damages for personal injuries
suffered either in the United States or in other countries. The Alien3
Tort Claims Act, enacted in the first Judiciary Act of 1789,1
provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions "by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."' 4 This statute was little used until
the Second Circuit's landmark case, Filartigav. Pena-Irala,15 when
that court held the federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit against a
former Paraguayan police officer for the alleged torture and murder
of the plaintiffs deceased Paraguayan relative. According to the
court, the customary international law prohibits official torture, and
(explaining that under the new airline security regulations, passengers will be
prohibited from carrying items such as boxcutters).
11. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scot., 37 F.3d 804, 811 (2d Cir. 1994).
12. See John Cichowski, Cherished Memories of Those Missing... Met
with an Outpouring of Compassion, THE REC. (Bergen County, NJ), Sept. 15,
2001, at A4.
13. Ch. 20 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
15. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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section 1350 provides subject matter jurisdiction for tort claims
based on violations of that law.
The import of this statute is that an alien can sue another alien in
a United States court for violations of international law even when
the violations of international law take place outside the United
States. Arguably, this statute would provide federal subject matter
jurisdiction over claims by aliens killed or injured in the September
11 disaster against Osama bin Laden and others responsible for the
attack. Without this statute, such plaintiffs could sue in state court,
but not federal court, because there would be no alienage jurisdiction
and their tort claims do not arise under federal law.
Not all courts were as receptive as the Filartigacourt to the use
of United States courts in cases where the claims arise in a foreign
country. In another important case, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,'6 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the Alien Tort Claims Act did not provide federal subject matter
jurisdiction over a case brought by citizens of Israel, the United
States and the Netherlands against the Palestine Liberation Army
(PLO) and Libya for murdering a number of civilians during a
terrorist attack in Israel. Although the three-member panel so held
on different grounds, they were unanimous that the Alien Tort
Claims Act could not reach such claims. Partially in response,
Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).' 8
TVPA provides a federal cause of action in favor of persons tortured
or extrajudicially killed, and therefore jurisdiction under section
1350, against any individuals acting under the actual or apparent
authority or color of law of any foreign state.
Directly combating the growing problem of terrorism, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism Act of 1990.18 Primarily a criminal statute,
the Antiterrorism Act also provides a potent civil remedy tool.
Section 2333 of the Antiterrorism Act allows plaintiffs injured or
killed as a result of an act of international terrorism to sue for treble
damages and attorney's fees. 19 Unlike the case of the Alien Tort
Claims Act and the TVPA, where federal and state court jurisdiction
16. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
17. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1993)).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339 (2000).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
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are concurrent, the private remedy available under the Antiterrorism
Act is exclusively federal.
The Antiterrorism Act defines international terrorism as acts that
occur primarily outside of the United States. 20 Therefore, the
Antiterrorism Act should be a powerful tool in cases where terrorists
act outside of the United States and kill or injure United States
citizens in foreign countries. The Daniel Pearl case, involving the
Wall Street Journalreporter killed in Pakistan, may be an example.
A problem with using the Antiterrorism Act in connection with the
September 11 events, however, is the limitation of the Act to cases
where the acts occurred primarily outside the United States. A case
can be made that although the injuries were suffered in the United
States, the planning that took place outside of the United States
satisfies the "primarily" requirement. However, Congress rectified
any ambiguity when it enacted the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (the
"Patriot Act").2 ' The Patriot Act expands the definition of the types
of terrorism that would give rise to a claim under section 2333.
Section 802 of the Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism as acts that
take place primarily within the United States. 22
Although enforcement of judgments rendered under any of these
provisions will be difficult to obtain, the various acts of Congress
freezing the assets of the terrorists and their cohorts provide some
solace. The year 2000 Terrorist Asset Report to Congress by the
Office of Asset Control,2 3 for example, indicated that $3.7 billion in
assets of six of seven Department of State designated sponsors of
terrorism were blocked by the United States. An additional $254
million of Taliban assets were blocked. By Executive Order on
September 23, 2001, President Bush froze the assets of twenty-seven
entities believed to be supporting the Al Qaeda network.2 4 This
resulted in the blocking of additional millions of dollars more,
including at least $5 million in the United States. Unfortunately,
however, plaintiffs may not be able to enforce judgments against
these assets because, in the exercise of its foreign affairs policies, the
20.
21.
22.
23.

See 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(c).
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
See id. § 802.
See http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/bulletin.txt (last visited Mar. 11,

2002).
24. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
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United States government may not release the funds to private
parties.
To the extent that victims of terrorism seek a remedy from
sovereign nations listed as a sponsor of terrorism (neither the
Taliban, because the United States never recognized the Taliban
government, nor Al Qaeda, a non-governmental entity, could seek
such protection), section 1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act generally provides an exception to the assertion of sovereign
immunity in cases against a foreign sovereign for personal injuries
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for
such an act.25 When the section 1605 exception is satisfied, the
federal courts will have jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330. Again, however, there may be
problems with enforcement ofjudgment.
III. THE SEPTEMBER 1 1TH VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND
Congress' decision to establish the VCF to provide a quick and
reasonable remedy for those who suffered personal injuries as a
result of the events of September 11 held the promise that many of
the problems discussed in the preceding section could be avoided.
As we will see, however, the VCF is not a perfect solution.
A. The Victim's CompensationFund: Procedures Underthe
Interim Final Rule
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress
took action to offer an alternative to court litigation for victims of the
attacks. On September 22, 2001, Congress provided for the creation
of the September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 as part of
the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the
Act).
The purpose of the fund is to compensate any victim or
relative for injury or death resulting from the September 11 attacks.27
The Act provided basic definitions and outlined general procedures
to be used in devising the system of compensation. It also authorized
Attorney General John Ashcroft, acting through a Special Master
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (West Supp. 2001).
26. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 403, 115 Stat. 237 (2001).
27. See id. (outlining the provisions for establishing VCF).
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appointed by him, to administer the plan and promulgate procedural
28
and substantive rules to that end.
The focus of this portion of the Article is to outline the proposed
rules promulgated under the Act and published for comment in
December 2001 (the "Interim Rule").29 The Interim Rule covered
claimant eligibility, the procedures for filing a claim, the review
process, methods of determining the amount of compensation,
distribution of payments, and limitations. This section will begin
with an overview of the initial procedures promulgated pursuant to
the Act, then it will address eligibility for compensation, including
calculation of compensation amounts, and will also address some of
the concerns the Interim Rule provoked. The next section of the
Article will assess the effect that public comments and criticism of
the Interim Rule had on the Final Rule issued by the Department of
Justice on March 7, 2002.30
1. Procedures: applying for compensation from the fund
One of the first steps in developing a compensatory scheme of
this size is to determine how people should apply for benefits. On
November 26, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft appointed
Kenneth Feinberg as Special Master. The Special Master was
charged with the monstrous, and at times unenviable, task of
implementing the Act by drawing up procedures and rules for
administering the VCF. Among the Special Master's first duties was
to create an application form.31 The eligibility form must be filed by
a victim or the victim's personal representative within two years after
regulations are issued, and has the effect of waiving the applicant's
right to litigate the claim in court. 32 In addition, at the time of filing,
eligible applicants may submit a request for advance benefits to
28. See Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 404, 115 Stat. 237-38 (2001).
29. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (interim final rule with request for comments)
[hereinafter Interim Rule].
30. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 Final Rule, 67 Fed.
Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104) [hereinafter
Final Rule].
31. See Eligibility Form and Applicationfor Advanced Benefits from the
September

11th

Victim

Compensation

Fund

of

2001,

at

http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/eligformappadvben.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2002).
32. See Interim Rule, supra note 29, at 66,283.
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alleviate immediate financial hardship, which is later deducted from
the Special Master's final award.33
Submitting the application thus begins the VCF process and
precludes other forms of recovery, including civil lawsuits. 34 The
claimant must then fill out a Death or Personal Injury Compensation
Form and submit it along with relevant documentation, such as tax
35
returns and disclosure of benefits received from collateral sources.
The claimant must select one of two tracks: Computation of
Presumed Award (Track A) or a Hearing (Track B). 36 Once this is
substantially complete, the claim is deemed filed, and the Special
Master has 120 days to determine an award.37 Regardless of whether
the claimant selects Track A or B, the application is subject to an
initial determination of eligibility. If claimants are initially found
ineligible
for VCF compensation, they may appeal to the Special
38
Master.
a. TrackA
Once a claim is deemed filed, a claims evaluator has forty-five
days to notify the Track A claimant of the presumed award.39 The
claimant may then either accept the award and demand payment, or
file supplemental submissions within twenty-one days and request
review before the Special Master or his designee. 41 The Special
Master must then decide whether there was an error in determining
the presumptive award or whether there are "extraordinary
circumstances" that were not considered in arriving at the
presumptive award.41 The Special Master then notifies the claimant

33. See id. at 66,284-85.

34. A straightforward flowchart detailing the claims process is available at
the Department of Justice website at http://www.usdoj.gov/
victimcompensation/flowchart dl9.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
35. The definition of "collateral source" is an extremely volatile issue, as
compensation from collateral sources offset VCF awards. See infra Part
III.A.3.b.
36. See Department of Justice website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
victimcompensation/flowchart_dl9.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
37. See Interim Rule, supranote 29, at 66,283.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 66,285.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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in writing of the final award determination, which is not subject to
any further review. 42
b. Track B
If the claimant elects Track B, the object is to present
information necessary for a complete understanding of the claim. 43
The Special Master may take various factors into account in
adjusting the award, including "the identity of the victim's spouse
and dependants; the financial needs of the claimant; facts affecting
noneconomic loss;" 44 and any other relevant factors the claimant
may proffer. Under the Interim Rule, review hearings are generally
45
limited to a maximum of two hours and may be public or private.
Counsel may be present, and the claimant may present witnesses,
including experts. 46 After the hearing, as in Track A, the Special
47
Master issues a final, binding award determination.
2. Eligibility: who may apply for compensation?
The Act requires that the Special Master place certain
limitations on who may apply for compensation from the VCF.
Simply stated, those eligible to apply for compensation are
individuals present at the WTC, Pentagon and the Pennsylvania crash
sites who suffered physical injury as a "direct result" or in the
"immediate aftermath" of the crashes, and personal representatives
of those who died on American Airline Flights 11 and 77 or United
Airlines Flights 93 and 175.48 "Immediate aftermath" was initially
defined as the period ending twelve hours after the crashes, or in the
case of rescue workers, ninety-six hours after the crashes. 49 The
Interim Rule defined "physical harm" as "a physical injury to the
body that was treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of
the injury having been sustained or within 24 hours of rescue ... "50
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
III.C.
50.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 66,282.
id. These standards are modified in the Final Rule. See infra Part

Interim Rule, supra note 29, at 66,282.
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Furthermore, the Act defined "present at the site" within certain
geographic limitations. 5' In addition, if there is a dispute as to who
the personal representative of a deceased victim is, the Special
Master may suspend determination of the claim. Alternatively, he
may calculate the appropriate amount, if sufficient information is
until the dispute is
available, and place the payment in escrow
52
resolved by parties or by the proper court.
The limitations on the type of harm compensated through the
VCF serve an important purpose. Congress designed the VCF to
compensate those who have suffered physical harm, not those whose
sole claim is emotional harm or property damage. 53 Importantly,
those who claim latent injuries are likewise ineligible. The Special
Master reasoned that to include such people would cause two
potential problems. Specifically, because of the legally preclusive
nature of the VCF claims process, claimants who make claims
against the VCF for latent injuries, but later manifest injuries greater
than those claimed, would be undercompensated. Conversely, those
who make latent claims now and manifest de minimis injuries (or
none at all) will be overcompensated.54
The geographic and temporal limitations purport to serve
Congressional intent as well. Limiting the geographic area allows
recovery for those persons who were at a location in which there was
"a demonstrable risk of physical harm resulting from the impact of
the aircraft or any subsequent fire, explosions, or collapse of
buildings ....55 This limitation also goes to the requirement that
compensated injuries be a direct result of the attacks. The temporal
requirement serves a similar end.
Of course, in reality, these limitations may undermine the
success of the VCF. For instance, although directly related to the
WTC attack, many who will claim personal injury due to their
inhalation of the polluted, smoky air in the months after September
11 are probably precluded from seeking compensation. Similarly,
the shopowners in the vicinity who suffered property damages and
51. See id.
52. See id. at 66,283. In many cases, the determination of the appropriate
representative will turn on state law.
53. See id. at 66,276.
54. See id.
55. Id.
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loss of business opportunity in the aftermath of the attack will also be
ineligible. Arguably, the VCF should provide a vehicle for the
resolution of all claims related to the attacks. Although there always
will be a point at which a line must be drawn, perhaps it was drawn
too soon.
3. Calculating losses: how much and why?
Of all the determinations and rules promulgated under the Act,
calculation of the final award is the most difficult for the Special
Master because it involves an assessment of the value of a life. As
lawyers, we may be used to applying economic concepts when
determining the appropriate amount of damages for death or.injuries.
For the victims and their families, however, such calculations appear
callous, unfair and inhuman. The Special Master tried to overcome
these concerns by articulating that his system would be based upon
two primary objectives:
1) to make the process efficient,
straightforward, and understandable to claimants; and 2) to treat each
claimant fairly based on individual circumstances and relative to
other claimants. 56 In formulating rules, the Special Master is
attempting to inform potential claimants and equip them with the
proper tools to determine whether to litigate or engage in claims
resolution via the VCF.
a. economic loss computation
The Special Master issued a schedule of presumed economic
losses that serve as a guideline for potential claimants in evaluating
their decision to file a claim with the VCF.57 The calculation of
economic losses under the Interim Rule involves five steps. First,
the victim's pretax earnings for the previous three years are
considered, including employer benefits. Second, wage growth is
calculated to compensate for promotions and inflation at a rate of
6.6% for victims up to thirty years of age, 5.1% for victims ages

56. See id. at 66,728.
57. See Presumed Economic and Non-Economic Loss Tables, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vcmatrices.pdf (last visited Mar.
11, 2002) [hereinafter Loss Tables].
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thirty-one to fifty, and 4.2% for victims over fifty. 58 Third, the
schedule assumes an average work life as defined by the Department
of Labor. Fourth, the amounts are adjusted to present value so that
they may be paid in a lump sum, reflecting investment potential.
Finally, the sum is reduced based on "consumption factors." 59 The
Special Master initially estimated that the average recovery, subject
to the collateral source rule discussed below, 60 would be $1.6
million, 61 and the range of recoveries for economic damages
would
62
million.
$4.35
and
$300,000
approximately
between
be
b. noneconomic loss and collateralsource compensation
Calculation of noneconomic losses and the offset of collateral
source compensation are extremely controversial. The Special
Master initially capped noneconomic loss at $250,000 per decedent,
plus $50,000 for the victim's spouse and each dependent. This is
equivalent to capping "pain and suffering" in the tort context. In
addition, the Act requires that any VCF award be offset by recovery
from "collateral sources." 63 Thus, monies received from insurance
policies, pensions, death benefit programs, and the like may be
deducted depending on the Special Master's final definition of
"collateral compensation."' 64 It should be noted that the Interim Rule
did not include contributions from charities as collateral source
58. See id. These wage increase assumptions are based on data gathered
from the Board of Actuaries of the Civil Service Retirement System and the
Board of Actuaries of the Military Retirement System.
59. Id. These consumption factors include the amount the decedent would
have consumed during his or her work life. This includes costs for food,
clothing, and transportation but excludes housing, health, education, insurance,
pensions, and cash contributions.
60. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
61. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Victims' FundLikely to Pay
Average of $1.6 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al.

62. See id. I should note that this incredibly wide range is due in part to the
fact that economic awards vary depending on age, number of dependents, and
income at time of death. The first figure is for a single decedent, age sixtyfive, with no dependents, who made $10,000 at the time of death. The latter is
for a married decedent, age thirty-five, with two dependents, who made
$175,000 at the time of death. The controversy behind such disparity is
addressed below.
63. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(b)(6), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001).
64. See Interim Rule, supranote 29, at 66,279.
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compensation. However, the Special Master may
later determine
65
that such benefits actually are a collateral source.
B. The Victim's CompensationFund: Problems
Public controversy ensued after the issuance of the Interim Rule
on December 21, 2001. Much of the negative comment arose out of
the collateral source provisions of the Interim Rule. The Special
Master bore the brunt of much criticism over this rule, perhaps
undeservedly because the Act itself provided for the collateral source
rule and made offsets mandatory.
As two commentators stated, "[T]he regulations deduct certain
benefits, like life insurance and pensions, from compensation awards
....
The proposed rules turn the Congressional legislation on its
head . . ."" In fact, the collateral source offset keeps the statute
standing on its feet.67 To the extent that the collateral source rule is
problematic, the defect is in the Act itself. Senator John Corzine of
New Jersey admitted that "Congress, in its haste to establish the
[VCF], was shortsighted in requiring [deduction of] so-called
collateral sources .... 68[I]t is up to Congress to fix the inequity of the
collateral source rule.',
It also appears the public and many attorneys misconceived the
nature of the Interim Rule. Congressional desire to make payments
as quickly as possible likely led to giving the Interim Rule the effect
of law upon its publication. However, the Rule clearly states that
"[t]his rule is designated 'interim,' however, because the Department
[of Justice] is also seeking further comment... and may expand or
adjust aspects of the rule .... ,,69 The entire purpose of notice and
65. See id.
66. Fred Price & Mitch Kleinman, The Damaged Spirit of the Sept. 11
Fund,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A24.
67. Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(b)(6) states: "The Special Master shall
reduce the amount of compensation.., by the amount of the collateral source
compensation the claimant has received or is entitled to receive ... ." In
addition, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 402(4) defines "collateral source" to include
"life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by
Federal, State, or local governments .... "
68. Sen. Jon S. Corzine, Fix the Victims' Fund, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2002,

at A14. In addition, Senator Corzine criticizes other politicians for taking
Kenneth Feinberg "to task" for the collateral source rule, preferring to cite
Congressional culpability. See id.
69. See Interim Rule, supra note 29, at 66,274.
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comment rulemaking is to allow the public the opportunity to suggest
changes that will make the rule better or more workable.
Still others question the fiscal wisdom of the VCF and the
precedent it sets. While Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton queried,
"[H]ow do you put a price tag on a life?" others asked why such a
scheme was not created after the bombings in Oklahoma City,
Nairobi, or even the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.70 The quick
creation of the VCF was seen as a betrayal for many of the victims'
relatives in these other tragedies who have unsuccessfully sought
compensation from the government. 7 1 The Special Master is in a
precarious position of administering a fund without a ceiling while
attempting to achieve fair results for victims and their families. The
"tension between providing compensation to families and limiting
the government's financial exposure" is no small task.72
In sum, the Special Master faces pressure from all sides. Given
the number of claimants, it was unlikely that he would arrive at a
Final Rule that pleases all parties. Pressure from claimants and
attorneys is likely to continue throughout the process of resolving
claims. In addition, Congress and taxpayers will be keeping an eye
on the payments. Although most Americans probably would like to
see the victims and their families made "whole," most also probably
do not want to see them overcompensated to the point where the
VCF becomes a budgetary black hole. There are some who are
73
outraged that the victims' families could become millionaires.
There are others who understandably complain that the stringency of
state law will result in no recovery for members of alternative
families, such as gay and lesbian partners or straight domestic
partners, including those with children. 74 Others complain that the
Interim Rule does not incorporate a measure of economic damages

70. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: Victims'

Compensation; Fundfor Victims' Families Already Proves Sore Point, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al. However, bills are pending in Congress that would

provide the victims of those attacks with the same benefits offered by the VCF.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See Final Rule, supra note 30, at 11,237.
74. See Elissa Gootman, Seeing Families, Senator Calls For Changes in
Sept. 11 Fund,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2002, at B2. However, the Special Master

has stated that he will provide benefits to the extent permitted by state law.
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for the value of household work.75 Some objections have been raised
to the use of public sector statistics to determine the economic losses
of people who worked predominately in the private sector.
Additionally, there were objections to the plan to determine awards
partially based on gender.
C. FinalRule Changes: Will They Help Alleviate Outcry?
On March 7, 2002, the Special Master issued the Final Rule that
incorporated several significant changes.76 The simplest change was
increasing the presumed noneconomic loss for spouses and
dependents from $50,000 each to $100,000. 77 Also, regarding
eligibility, the temporal limitation for "physical harm" was expanded
to "within 72 hours of injury or rescue for those victims who were
unable to realize immediately the extent of their injuries or for whom
treatment by a medical professional was not available,"78 from the
initial twenty-four hour restriction. Additionally, the Special Master
is given great discretion in extending the time period for rescue
personnel on a case-by-case basis. 79 This may or may not allow
rescue workers to recover for injuries such as "WTC cough,"
depending on how much discretion is exercised.
The rules for collateral source offsets were likewise modified to
address some of the concerns raised by comments to the Interim
Rule. The Final Rule allows the Special Master to exclude insurance
premiums and other forms of self-contribution, made during the
decedent's lifetime, from the offset calculus. 80 The Special Masters'
statement, preceding the Final Rule, explains that certain government81
benefits should not be included in determining the offset amount.
These include: victim tax relief, contingent Social Security benefits,
contingent workers' compensation benefits, 401(k) accounts, savings

75. See Final Rule, supra note 30, at 11,233, 11,239. This portion of the
Special Master's statement notes the initial concern that replacement services

were not mentioned in the Interim Rule.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 54. The presumed loss for decedents remained at $250,000.
78. Id. at 11,245.
79. See id. ("Or within such time period as the Special Master may
determine for rescue personnel.")
80. See id. at 11,246.
81. See id. at 11,233-34.
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accounts, or other investments.12 Most importantly, the Special
Master stresses the fact that presumed awards are not binding, and
that all claimants may present additional evidence of "individualized
circumstances" at hearings.
Additionally, under the Final Rule, salary tables for men will be
used to determine all victims' worth.83 This will benefit women and
not penalize men as would have been the case if neutral tables were
used. The Final Rule also considers nonwage work, such as
household work, in determining awards.84
The Final Rule contains a significant change designed to address
the problem of whether a particular claimant ought to pursue a
remedy in the VCF or in court. Claimants may meet with VCF
administrators to receive advice about whether certain forms of
extra-VCF compensation qualify as collateral sources and possibly
receive a non-binding "ballpark" award figure. This provision is
very important because it goes to the goal of providing claimants
enough information to make an intelligent decision about whether to
waive their right to judicial resolution of their claims.
Whether these changes are enough is a question easily debated,
but not easily answered in any definitive way. Surely the Special
Master is aware of the old saying that "you can't please everybody."
The idea, however, is to please as many people as possible and
encourage widespread use of the VCF. Mary Schiavo, a plaintiffs'
attorney from Los Angeles, stated that she believed the VCF was
geared toward low- and medium-income claimants with many
dependents.8 5 Assuming this is true, there is a likelihood that highincome claimants may feel that they would
not receive their fair
86
share from the VCF and pursue litigation.

82. See id.
83. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, 9-11 Victim Fund to Consider Nonwage
Work,
1
ABA
J.
EREPORT
(Mar.
15,
2002),
at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereportlml5now.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2002).
84. See Final Rule, supra note 30, at 11,234.

85. See Bob Van Voris, Lawyers Take Over Ground Zero: Litigation to
Follow CompensationRegulations,NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at Al.
86. See id. One possible reason for this effect is the larger amounts of
collateral compensation that higher income claimants are likely to receive
(such as life insurance payments).
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More extremely, Donald Nolan, who represents plaintiffs and is
based in Chicago, suggested that some parties are so disenchanted
with the VCF that they may challenge the entire system.87 Potential
claims in this vein could be that the Special Master exceeded his
authority under the statute or that the statute itself is
unconstitutional. 88 ATLA president, Leo Boyle, has identified a
more pressing concern for those who chance litigation. Because
property damage is not covered by the VCF, and because Congress
capped airline liability at insurance policy limits, are personal injury
tort litigants likely to recover anything any time soon, or at all?
Boyle points out that with $40-50 billion dollars in property damage,
many with equally viable claims against the airlines, and only $3.2
billion dollars of available airline insurance, even assuming attorneys
can get past difficult issues such as causation, actual recovery is
highly debatable.89 In the end, despite collateral offsets and other
controversial VCF provisions, the VCF may be a claimant's best
chance of seeing any recovery. However, as of mid-April 2002, only
434 claims have been filed with the VCF, and only 265 are
applications of representatives of the 3,054 people killed.90 Once the
first awards, based on a sample of representative cases, are
announced, probably by August 2002, victims likely will have the
benchmarks they need to decide whether to participate in the VCF.
The success or failure of the VCF will be closely watched, not
necessarily because it is under-inclusive in the sense that it
compensates only those who suffered personal injuries at a particular
place at a particular point in time, but because of the precedent it has
established in terms of Congressional intervention into the tort
process. Let us now turn to the question whether the VCF is, in a
sense, the camel's nose under the tent.
87. See id.
88. See id. The likelihood of success of such claims involves a detailed
analysis of related questions of administrative law that are beyond the scope of
this Article.

89. See id.
90. See Few Applicants for the September 11 fund so far, CNN.COMIU.S.,

Apr. 17, 2002. Reportedly the first claims filed by a worker at the WTC was
filed on April 8, 2002. Smithwick v. American Airlines Inc., no. 02 CV 2669
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2002). The plaintiff is the widower of a portfolio manager
who worked on the 93rd floor of the north tower. She sued the airline and the
firm handling passenger screening at Boston's Logan Airport. See The Docket,
NAT'L L.J., at B8, col. 4 (Apr. 15, 2002).
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IV. THE CAMEL'S NOSE UNDER THE TENT?

Congress did not immediately provide a compensation fund for
the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, another unspeakable
disaster. Nor did it immediately provide compensation to the victims
of the 1993 WTC bombing. The cases arising out of that disaster,
which luckily resulted in death and injury to relatively few people,
are still pending in courts in New York. Moving to another sort of
disaster, despite invitations and pleas from the United States
Supreme Court, Congress to date has failed to do anything, except
introduce a few bills, to resolve the asbestos litigation.9 In the past,
for good reasons having to do with federalism and separation of
powers concerns, Congress has left it to our tort system to provide
remedies for those who suffer personal injuries, except in a very few
exceptional cases where the government itself was arguably the most
culpable party.
Now, however, it increasingly appears that Congress may want
to play an important role in the resolution of mass torts an& other
complex cases. 92 While Congress likely has the power to enact
legislation that governs how complex cases should be resolved, such
legislation presents complex separation of powers and federalism
problems. 93 Whether Congress acts in a way that governs the
procedures to be used in various types of cases or whether Congress
enacts substantive rules, these problems are raised to a greater or
lesser degree.
What I would like to explore in this part of the Article is a
problem I discussed in an article on federalism that I wrote for this
journal a couple of years ago. 94 Specifically, I questioned the
motives of various members of Congress, typically Republicans, who
sought legislation that would allow state court class actions based on
state causes of action to be removed to federal court notwithstanding
a lack of complete diversity and problems with the requisite
91. One such proposal in the House was the Asbestos Compensation Act of
2000, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (2000).
92. See Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional Federalism: The
Implications of the New FederalismDecisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other
Complex Litigation, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1559 (2000) [hereinafter
Federalism].
93. See id. at 1563-64.
94. See id. at 1605-09.
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jurisdictional amount.95 On the other hand, as a proponent of
consolidation and aggregation in complex cases, there are clearly
practical reasons justifying such legislation. The question is how to
balance federalism with practicality.
At the time that I wrote that article, it seemed inconceivable that
Congress would actually get into the business of providing remedies
for persons who suffer personal injuries. In Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor96 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,97 the Supreme Court
rejected the class action settlements proposed in those cases to deal
with the asbestos mess. Rather, the Supreme Court in both of those
cases essentially begged Congress to intervene in the resolution of
the "elephantine" asbestos mess. 97 Nothing happened. So, even
though the September 11 disaster hopefully is a sui generis case,
Congress' reaction to that disaster may signal its growing taste for
intervening in the resolution of other litigations that implicate the
interests of our nation as a whole.
95. See id. The legislation in question is the Class Action Fairness Act,
most recently introduced in the House as H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2001), and
in the Senate as S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001). The House passed its version of
the bill on March 13, 2001 by a vote of 233-190. The Senate version of the bill
is still under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See House
Approves Class Action Legislation; Bill Would Expand Federal Jurisdiction,
2002 U.S.L.W 2574 Legal News (Mar. 19,2002).
Similarly, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the
Securities Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which bars most securities class
actions based on state law fraud theories. It supplements the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that was designed to heighten the standards for
prosecuting such actions in federal court. The 1998 Act is designed to close a
perceived loophole in the 1995 Act. Supporters of the 1998 Act believed that
the increased filing of class actions in state courts based on state law fraud
theories of liability undermined the 1995 Act. The 1998 Act amended Section
16 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to prohibit class actions brought by private parties based on such
theories. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb (amended by Pub. L. No. 105-353, Title
I, § 101(a)(1) & (b)(1), 112 Stat. 3227, Nov. 3, 1998). It further provides that
state court class actions brought on such theories are removable to the federal
court in the district in which the state action was filed. Moreover, it permits
federal courts to stay discovery in state court actions.
96. 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (rejecting asbestos class action settlement certified
under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) based on inadequate representation of future
claimants).
97. 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (rejecting asbestos class action settlement certified
under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) for lack of adequate representation).
98. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
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This does not mean, of course, that Congress will or should
intervene in any garden-variety mass tort. For example, it is hard to
believe that Congress would care whether a particular company, such
as A.H. Robins for example, becomes bankrupt because the
particular branded product it sold-the Dalkon Shield-allegedly
caused injury to thousands of users of the product. 99 There are
similar products on the market. We can argue about whether it is a
good thing or a bad thing that state product liability laws protect
consumers, but also punish corporations and perhaps chill the
development of new products and may result in some desirable or
worthwhile products being taken off the market. Similarly, it is hard
to believe that Congress should be overly concerned about the
problems raised in the breast implant litigation. 1°° However, when
personal injury litigation threatens the existence of an entire industry
or industries, Congress undoubtedly will and perhaps should take a
great interest.
It is important to remember that in the VCF, Congress preserved
the victims' right to sue the airlines and others. However, it capped
10 1
what the airlines would ultimately have to pay in the aggregate.
And, in section 408(b)(1) of the Act creating the VCF, Congress
created an exclusive federal cause of action for damages arising out
of the September 11 terrorist-related attacks.' 0 2 It also provides that
99. See generally Claimant's Trust, supra note 3; Paradigm Lost, supra
note 3, at 123-56 (discussing Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust).
100. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996);
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
101. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §
201(a)(1), 115 Stat. 646 (2001). The amendments to Pub. L. No. 107-42
contained therein cap airline liability at the limit of the airlines' liability
insurance.
102. H.R. 2926 § 408(b)(1) provides:
AVAILABILITY OF ACTION- There shall exist a federal cause
of action for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent
crashes of American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United
Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September 11, 2001.
Notwithstanding section 40120(c) of Title 49, United States Code,
this cause of action shall be the exclusive remedy for damages
arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such flights.
H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. § 408(b)(1) (1st Sess. 2001); see also H.R. 2926 §
104.1 (setting forth that the purpose of the Act is to "provide compensation to
eligible individuals who were physically injured as a result of the terrorist-
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the law of the state where the crash occurred applies to any suit
brought under the VCF.10 3 The bottom line, however, is that
Congress is channeling all claims arising out of the September 11
attacks to either the VCF or a particular federal court.
One obvious reason for coming up with the compensation
scheme that Congress developed was the need to protect the airline
industry. This protection preserves our ability to use this method of
transportation. Similarly, in situations such as the asbestos litigation,
in terms of types of claims and sets of defendants, Congress could
decide that there is a need to keep entire industries afloat to ensure
that staple products are available to people across the country.
A major barrier, however, to any such effort will be the
perception that the VCF is the camel's nose under the tent, to put it
one way, or stealth tort reform, to put it less charitably. Looking
back, we can ask: Was the first assault on the tort system the battle
for tort reform that began in the 1980s? Was it the state attorney
generals' tobacco litigation settlement that needed Congress'
blessing?' 0 4 Was it the Supreme Court's invitation in Amchem? Or,
do we see the real seeds of the demise of the tort system in the claims
resolution facility created by Congress to compensate the victims of
September 11? Is Congress going to take over the tort arena? Where
are we headed?
It used to be that tort plaintiffs would seek relief in state or
federal court. Typically, one, but no more than a few, plaintiffs
would sue individually for compensatory and punitive damages, and
they would ultimately win, lose, or settle within the context of their
individual lawsuits. 105 By the mid- to late-1980s, things had
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, and to the 'personal
representatives' of those who were killed as a result of the crashes.").
103. H.R. 2926 § 408(b)(2); 66 Fed. Reg. 246 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Executive
Order 13132-Federalism) ("This regulation will not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and
the States, or on distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 13132,
it is determined that this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a federal assessment.").
104. See Barry Meier, Remaining States Approve the Pact on Tobacco Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al.

105. See Claimants Trust, supra note 3, at 87-94 (noting that initial stages of
the Dalkon Shield litigation were marked by concerns of individual autonomy
and an absence of pressure for global resolution).
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changed. More and more product liability suits were displacedsometimes voluntarily, sometimes not-by class action litigation and
settlement. The Supreme Court largely put the kibosh on mass tort
class action settlements in Amchem, the massive
asbestos class action
1 °6
action.
take
to
Congress
exhorting
settlement,
Of course in the past, federal regulatory agencies have played a
major role in mass tort cases. For example, in the Dalkon Shield
litigation, the breast implant litigation, and the diet drug litigation,
the Food and Drug Administration played a major role in providing
the public with information about safety problems with a product.
Indeed, the federal regulatory agencies may have been "played" by
some of the parties to help establish their litigation positions. But, in
those cases, the litigation was already mature or maturing.
Moreover, all parties expected that the lawsuits would be resolved
through litigation-be it in state, federal or bankruptcy court. Now,
however, there appears to be a de-emphasis on the courts' traditional
common law approach to resolving claims in an ad hoc way. and a
greater emphasis on legislative solutions or statutes that rein in the
courts discretion. Are we witnessing the end of the tort system? Or,
the mass tort system?
Are we seriously moving toward
administrative resolution of mass torts? If so, is that a good thing?
In an earlier article, I discussed the irony, in this age of Supreme
Court-decreed federalism (notwithstanding Bush v. Gore 0 7 ), of
congressional Republicans proposing legislation that would allow
defendants to take state law-based claims out of state courts and
remove them to federal court. 10 8 In that article, I suggested various
reasons why, in general, such legislation is not generally a good idea.
Rather, I have come to the view that state courts have an important
role to play, even when there is concurrent federal jurisdiction and
the federal courts will be involved as well, in being the primary
interpreters of issues of state law. In our federal system, we
traditionally have left it to the states to provide remedies for victims
of personal injuries, breach of contract, property disputes, etc. This
106. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997)
(commenting that "[t]he benefits asbestos-exposed persons might gain from the
establishment of a grand scale compensation scheme is a matter fit for
legislative consideration .... .")(emphasis added).
107. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
108. See Federalism,supranote 92, at 1561.
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view is not inconsistent with my long-held belief that federal courts
are not only appropriate, but oftentimes, are the only effective place
to resolve major litigations. I presume, for example, in my
Claimant's Trust article, that claims values for a particular mass tort
litigation have been established in traditional ways pursuant to state
law. 1°9 Once claims values are established, however, and the crush
of cases involving a particular product overwhelm the state and
federal judiciaries, the time will come for global resolution that, as a
practical matter, ought to be achieved at the federal level.
I have argued that the use of procedural tools available only in
the federal courts can help achieve such a resolution. I have even
argued that it is appropriate to allow the federal judiciary to apply
federal common law in appropriate cases to resolve some of the
substantive issues in the case." 0 But my argument always has been
that the judiciary has the competence to develop the right approach
to resolving disputes, specifically personal injury cases."' I have
never argued that Congress has the duty or the competence to be
involved intimately in how personal injury cases are to be resolved.
And perhaps the problems the VCF Special Master is having
suggests that I was correct to question Congress' competence in this
area.
Nonetheless, given the exigencies of the September 11 disaster,
and the current phase of the asbestos litigation for example, I think
congressional action may well be appropriate. In both situations,
there are very good reasons for ensuring prompt and reasonable
compensation to personal injury victims. In the case of the WTC and
Pentagon victims, one can view them as victims of war being cared
for by the government. Certainly asbestos victims can hardly be
analogized to victims of a war. Nonetheless, there are some very
sick individuals who have serious illnesses that can almost only be
explained by exposure to asbestos. They deserve reasonable
compensation in a reasonable period of time. There are many other
asbestos claimants who may be less deserving, but their claims are
clogging the courts; indeed, they have been clogging the courts for

109. See Claimants Trust, supra note 3.
110. See Multi-Tort Cases, supra note 3,at 200-08.
111. See id. at 200-08, 223-24.
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decades, and all estimates
suggest that they will be clogging the
2
courts for decades more."
In addition, we need to think about and beyond the implications
for the defendants in these cases. In the September 11 disaster, the
bankruptcy of an entire industry critical to our nation's economy
loomed large. No rational person in this country could imagine life
without planes flying overhead. Indeed, it was eerie enough for me
in September, both in New York City and in Los Angeles, not to hear
jets flying overhead; to look up and see no planes flying. Similarly,
the range of defendants now being sued in the asbestos cases has
blossomed because so many of the traditional defendants are now
bankrupt. It can be argued that asbestos threatens bankruptcy in
multiple industries across our economy.
There have been bills proposed in Congress to deal with the
asbestos litigation. The Asbestos Compensation Act Bill (H.R.
1283) was resubmitted in the Spring of 2000."' The Act would set
up an administrative compensation fund replenished by contributions
from asbestos defendants. The bill has not been resubmitted in the
107th Congress, but other bills that would provide tax relief to
asbestos defendants who pay into settlement funds are on the table.
And, there are rumors that Congress will entertain a bill that would
allow for the deferral on unimpaired claims, so that asbestos victims
with actual serious injuries can be suitably compensated. The fact
that these bills keep coming up is one indication that Congress will
continue to focus on the asbestos problem.
The climate for the passage of an asbestos compensation bill has
improved. Those dissenting from the adoption of the 2000 Asbestos
Compensation Bill" 4 argued that the courts had improved settlement
112. See generally Deborah Hensler et al., RAND INSTTUTE FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, Aug. 2001 (providing an overview of the current state of asbestos
claims and the continuing growth of such litigation). RAND has issued studies
on the asbestos litigation problem fairly regularly since the 1980s. The August
2001 report is an advanced summary of a more detailed report due for
publication in Spring 2002.
113. See H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (2000) (remarking that this Bill had
originally been introduced Mar. 25, 1999).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 106-782, at 81-82 (2000). The dissenters suggest
that courts have had success in streamlining asbestos litigation, largely due to
MDL procedures. They also suggest that "asbestos is now a mature tort....
[A]sbestos cases today are less time consuming... than other types of tort
action." Id. at 81.
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and trial procedures. In reality, the courts are more overwhelmed
than ever because the number of claims filed has spiked dramatically
in the last couple of years." 15
The opponents of the 2000 bill also argued that the Chapter 11
problem-the threat of bankruptcy enunciated by asbestos
defendants-was overstated. 116 They cited comments of asbestos
defendants in their Securities and Exchange Commission filings that
minimized the materiality of the asbestos threat. Things have
changed dramatically. All but one or two of those7 named, and many
others, have now filed for Chapter 11 protection."1
Critics also stated that the bill amounted to an unjustified
corporate bail out for culpable defendants who knew that exposed
workers were put at risk. In actuality, we now see hundreds of new
defendants, including smaller local defendants being asked to foot a
larger and larger share of the damage because most of the traditional
defendants are in Chapter 11.118
Similarly, a number of the provisions were critiqued for
smacking too much of tort reform--caps on punitive damages;
attorney's fees; choice of law and forum selection-and for being an
opt-out rather than opt-in plan; that there would be increased delay;
that the medical criteria was too tough, etc. 19 In actuality, if
Congress really wants to do something for victims and corporations,
these flaws can be negotiated away.
Congress is showing an increasing willingness to deal with
personal injury claims when there is a "disaster." As discussed
above, Congress acted with dispatch to simultaneously prevent the
airline industry from crashing and helping the victims of September
11 get quick compensation. 120 It remains to be seen how well the
115. See Hensler et al., supra note 112, at 2-5. Broadening the types of
defendants sued is one factor contributing to the growth of asbestos claims.
Much of the information gathered by RAND directly controverts the positions
of the dissenter in the 2000 House Report. See id.
116. H.R. REP. No. 106-782, at 82 (2000).
117. See Hensler et al., supra note 112, at 51.
118. See id.
119. The dissenting views regarding all of these subjects are presented in
H.R. REP. NO. 106-782, at 79-96 (2000).
120. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act was passed
just eleven days after the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon. See Pub. L.
No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
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compensation fund will work, but especially if it succeeds, it may
well be the camel's nose under the tent. Prior to the Act, one of the
few times Congress involved itself in the personal injury realm was
in the case of the Swine Flu disaster several decades ago when the
federal government itself was one of the culpable targets. 12 1 Now,
there are bills to provide immunity to insurance companies, drug
companies, etc. in the wake of September 11 to prevent those
industries from going under in the case of another terrorist disaster.
Certainly, the asbestos mess does not present the same kind of
disaster as the various damages resulting from an act of terrorism. It
is appropriate, however, for Congress to consider, stepping in to
prevent the decimation of an entire industry or set of industries. As
the asbestos mess, or some similar mass tort or other problem
morphs and begins to engulf whole new industries and companies,
action would be justified.
Plaintiffs lawyers and Congressional Democrats will
increasingly have an interest in seeing appropriate legislation. More
companies can use the threat of Chapter 11, or the filing of Chapter
11 to stop all lawsuits against them. 22 Once a Chapter 11 is filed,
serious delays and often reduced compensation (especially in the
ease of asbestos) are always the outcome. Chapter 11 may not be an
option for all defendants-they lose autonomy and it scares investors
who may not understand the benefits of it to the company-but the
threat and reality is there and those'with the interests of plaintiffs in
mind need to deal with the reality..
Of course, drawing the line between a real disaster and what
amounts to a plea for a corporate bailout will not be easy. But, in
this complicated time, with the federal courts' wings clipped,
121. See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-380, 90 Stat. 1113. Passage of this statute at the behest of President Ford
stemmed from a swine flu outbreak at the Army base in Fort Dix, New Jersey.
Some feared that an outbreak on the scale of the influenza epidemic of 1918-19
was possible and a nationwide program inoculated about 40 million people.
However, the inoculations themselves proved deadly for many who had
allergic reactions to the shots. The statute provided that the only remedy
available would be against the government by administrative remedy.
Manufacturers and administrators of the vaccine were insulated from liability.
For a concise synopsis of the events surrounding the swine flu program, see
Paul Mickle, 1976: Fear of a Great Plague at http://www.capitalcentury.com/
1976.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1994).
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legislative compromises can be made that will provide reasonable,
efficient and relatively quick compensation when the judicial system
is unable to do its job.
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress has moved quickly to provide a system of
compensation for many of the victims of the September 11 disaster.
The September I 1th Victims Compensation Act simultaneously
provides protection for the airline industry, undoubtedly a critical
one for our economy as well as our convenience (I can attest to this
need, having taken the train to Los Angeles from New York-four
days and three nights-in the aftermath of September 11) and
provides the tools, perhaps imperfectly, to provide reasonable and
prompt compensation to victims. It is hard to argue that the statutory
scheme set up by Congress in its haste is perfect. Moreover, it is not
appropriate as a general matter for the legislative branch to do what
courts are in the business of doing, especially since the courts do it
best. 123 Thus, it would be regrettable if the VCF is the camel's nose
under the tent in terms of it being stealth tort reform. But, it may
provide an indication that in some limited areas, where a judicial
resolution appears inadequate, the asbestos mess being the obvious
one, Congress may and should act.

123. See Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases, supra note 3, at 167-73, 223-24

(suggesting that the federal courts are in "the best position to provide a fair
resolution... in mass toxic tort litigation," and that resolving choice of law
questions "is no more burdensome in [the mass tort] context than any other.").

